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UNITED STATES v: STEINMETZ: THE LEGAL
LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR, REVISITED

Susan Poser·
Elizabeth R. Varon··
I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the enduring and yet unresolved issues concerning
the Civil War is its legal nature: Was it an insurrection or an
international war?l During the war and since, the United States
courts have repeatedly been called upon to determine the status
of property which was under the control of the Confederacy and
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1. An insurrection is an "organized and armed uprising for public political purposes." ALFRED H. KELLEY & WINFRED A HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
408 (4th ed. 1970). Insurgents do not possess the belligerent rights of sovereign
states and ai-e subject to prosecution as criminals under the United States Constitution. Id. at 409. An international war, by contrast, is a conflict between two sovereign states, each possessing full belligerent rights according to international law. Id.
725
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its agents during the Civil War. In the process of making such
determinations, the courts have reopened questions about the
war's legal status. United States v. Steinmetz 2 is such a case.
In December 1990 the United States filed an action in replevin under the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking the return
of a beU believed to be the ship's beU from the Confederate raider C.S.S. Alabama. 3 The C.S.S. Alabama was sunk by the Union ship U.S.S. Kearsarge off the coast of Cherbourg, France, in
June 1864 in a celebrated Civil War naval battle.4 The defendant, Steinmetz, an antique dealer, had obtained the beU in
1979 in England and brought it back to his home in New Jersey.5 The district court found for the United States. 6 The judgment of the district court was subsequently affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 7 As we shall see, the
Steinmetz case forced the courts to confront the ambiguous legal
status of the Civil War but not, ironicaUy, to resolve it.
In February 1861 decades of sectional conflict culminated in
the formation of the Confederate States of America by seven
southern states which had seceded in the aftermath of Abraham
Lincoln's election as president. Advocates of secession had long
contended that secession was constitutional and that the federal
government and foreign powers alike would be obliged to recognize the legality and sovereignty of a government of the seceded
states.8 In March 1861, in his first inaugural address, President
Lincoln countered this claim with his insurrection theory. President Lincoln declared that secession was legally void and that
any acts against the United States taken by the seceded states
and their newly formed government would be considered "insurrectionary" and treasonous. 9

2. 973 F.2d 212 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).

3. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 215.
4. United States V. Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (D.N.J. 1991), affd,
973 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1992), ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
5. Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. at 1297.
6. Id. at 1300.
7. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 224.
8. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATl'LE CRY OF FREEDOM 37-41, 234-35, 239-40
(1988).
9. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 582·83 (Roy P. BaIser ed.,
Kraus Reprint Co. 1969) (1946).
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Mer hostilities broke out in April 1861, Lincoln and other
Northern leaders c1ung, in their rhetoric, to the notion that the
war was nothing more than an insurgency-the United States
never formally dec1ared war, refused to recognize as sovereign
the Confederate States of America, and consistently referred to
Confederates as traitors. 10 As the war progressed, however,
Northern rhetoric was increasingly at odds with Northern policies. The federal government found it impractical to treat the
Confederates as criminals and treated them instead as
belligerents.l l
Nowhere was the gulf between rhetoric and policy more
evident than in the conduct of the war on the high seas. In one
of his first official acts after the Confederate bombardment of
Fort Sumter, President Lincoln announced the blockade of the
Southern portS.12 To do so was, accor9ing to internationallaw,
virtually to recognize the belligerent status of the Confederacy.13 But Lincoln refused to concede that the blockade had such
legal implications. In announcing the blockade, he also declared:

me any person, under the pretended authority of the said [Confederate] States, or under any other pretense"shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on board of her,
such person will be held amenable ta the laws of the United
States for the prevention and punishment ofpiracy.14

The punishment for piracy, as for treason, was death. 15
Thus, with Lincoln's establishment of the blockade, the dual
theory of the Civil War was born.
.
The forging of this dual theory of the war by the executive

10. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 59-65 (rev.
ed. 1964).
11. MCPHERSON, supra note 8, at 387-88.
12. See MCPHERSON, supra note 8, at 313.
13. See RANDALL, supra note 10, at 69. In the nineteenth century, as in the
earlier times, the principles of international maritime law were not codified and
were the subject of bitter debate among contending nations. Bee JOHN HA'ITENDORF,
MARITIME CONFLICT IN THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 101-13 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994). While the exact nature of
belligerent rights was in dispute, in practice, belligerents typicaIIy asserted the right
to seize enemy property, to institute a blockade, and to take prisoners of war.
14. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. 1258, 1259 (1861).
15. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, § 2, 3 Stat. 600; Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77,
§ 5, 3 Stat. 510.
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branch was no accident. President Lincoln and the Union Congress recognized that for political reasons it was impossible to
concede full belligerent status to the Confederacy because this
would amount to a recognition of sovereignty and thus, implicitly, of the legality of secession. On the other hand, it was impractical to fight a full-scale war as if it were an insurrection. Such
an approach would presumably have forced the United States to
put on trial for treason every person involved in the
Confederacy's war effort. By fighting the war as if both sides
were belligerents while at the same time insisting that it was a
mere insurrection, the United States could simultaneously exploit both the practical and the political expediencies. 16
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to
resolve the contradiction in the United States position in a case
early in the war that challenged the legal basis for the blockade.
In the Prize Cases,17 the owners of four ships captured by United States forces pursuant to the blockade challenged the seizure
of their vessels on the ground that without a prior declaration of
war by Congress, Lincoln's creation of a blockade, which is recognized under the law of nations as an instrument of war, was
unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 18 The owners argued
that if there was no war, then Lincoln could not usurp the role
of Congress by taking it upon himself to "declare war . . . and
make rules concerning captures on land and water."19 The Supreme Court in the Prize Cases resolved the issue of the war's
legal status primarily on practical grounds, recognizing the Confederacy as a belligerent power and stating that the defendants
cannot ask a Court to affect a technical ignorance of the existence
of a war, which aH the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil
war known in the history of the human race, and thus cripple the
arm of the Government and paralyze its power by subtle definitions and ingenious sophisms.2O

16. See HENRY D. SHAPIRO, CONFISCATION OF CONFEDERATE PROPERTY IN THE
NORTH 3 (1962).

17. The Brig Amy Warwick, The Schooner Crenshaw, The Barque Hiawatha,
The Schooner Brilliante, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) [hereinafter Pme Cases].
18. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 643-44.
19. Id. at 647 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11).
20. Id. at 669-70. The Court also suggested that Congress's ratification of the
blockade in July 1861 retroactively authorized the blockade. Id. at 670-71.
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Most interesting for these purposes, however, was the
Court's approbation of the United States's dual treatment of the
war. While recognizing the Confederacy's de facto belligerent
status, the Court also supported and reinforced the ambiguity
that marked the United States's characterization of the war:
Insurrection against a government may or may not Clllminate in
an organized rebellion, but a civil war always begins by insurrection against the lawful authority of the Government. A civil
war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents . . . . When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a
hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their
independence; have cast off their allegiance; have organized ar- .
mies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign,
the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a
war. They claim to be in arms to establish their liberty and independence, in order to become a sovereign State, while the sover·
eign party treats them as insurgents and rebels who owe allegiance, and who should be punished with death for their treason.21
Thus, the Court determined, it is in the nature of civil war that
belligerent status is granted ta the insurgents sub silentio while
the sovereign continues ta call them traitors:
It is not the less a civil war, with the belligerent parties in hostile
array, because it may be called an "insurrection" by one side, and
the insurgents be considered as rebels or tràitors. It is not nece~sary that the independence of the revolted province or State be
acknowledged in order to constitute it a party belligerent in a war
according to the law of nations.22
The Prize Cases, it might be said, constituted the first challenge ta the contradictory approach that the United States employed in its conduct of the Civil War and resulted in the federal
government's first success at turning back such a challenge.
United States v. Steinmetz,23 130 years later, constituted the
latest such challenge.

21.
22.
23.
denied,

Id. at 666·67 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 669.
763 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1991), affd, 973 F.2d 212 (3d Ciro 1992), cert.
113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
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II. THE EXPLOITS OF THE ALABAMA
The Steinmetz case, no less than the Prize Cases, had its
origins in the blockade, for the blockade in large part accounts
for the controversial origins of the Confederate raider Alabama.
When the blockade was established in April 1861, the fledgling
Confederate States of America had no navy of which to speak. 24
Not only did the Confederacy lack a maritime tradition, a merchant marine, and a shipbuilding industry, but it was denied, by
the formidable Northem navy's blockade, access to its own ports.
Under such adverse conditions, Confederate Secretary of the
Navy Stephen R. Mallory had to rely on clever subterfuge and
help from allegedly neutral foreign powers in order to build a
navy.25
In May 1861, Mallory dispatched special agent James D.
Bulloch to Liverpool, England, to arrange for the building of
Confederate ships in English shipyards. What Mallory had in
mind was the construction of a fleet of high-speed cruisers which
could disrupt Northern commerce and run the blockade. 26
Britain's Foreign Enlistment Act,27 which prohibited British
shipyards from outfitting warships for belligerent powers, technically made Bulloch's mission illegal. 26 But together with some
powerful British supporters who welcomed the opportunity to
undermine United States naval strength, Bulloch found a loophole in the law-he would build his Confederate steamers in
British ports but outfit them with their guns and ammunition
elsewhere. 29
The first Confederate raider built in Britain under Bulloch's
aegis was the C.S.S. Florida. The Florida, disguised as a mer-

24. WARREN F. SPENCER, THE CONFEDERATE NAVY IN EUROPE 2 (1983); RAPHAEL
SEMMES, THE CONFEDERATE RAIDER ALABAMA: SELECTIONS FROM MEMOIRS OF SERVICE AFLoAT DURING THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 27 (1962).
25. WILLIAM M. FOWLER, JR., UNDER Two FLAGS: THE AMERICAN NAVY IN THE
CIVIL WAR 40-44 (1990).
26. SPENCER, supra note 24, at 3-4.
27. Foreign Enlistment Act, 59 Geo. 3, ch. 69 (Eng.).
28. See SPENCER, supra note 24, at 9. This was the basis upon which the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal in 1872 awarded damages ta the United States against
Great Britain. SPENCER, supra note 24, at 9, and infra notes 75 and 201.
29. CHESTER G. HEARN, GRAY RAIDERS OF THE SEA: How EIGHT CONFEDERATE
WARSHIPS DESTROYED THE UNION'S HIGH SEAS COMMERCE 6-7, 52-53 (1992).
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chant vessel, left Britain and headed for the Bahamas, where
she was outfitted with weapons. She then successfully ran the
Union blockade and picked up. a crew at Mobile, Alabama.30
Following the example set by earlier Confederate cruisers such
as the C.S.S. Sumter31 and C.S.S. Nashville, both of which had
been converted from merchant ships to warships in Confederate
ports, the Florida soon established herself as a dreaded foe of
Union shipping interests.32 In her brief career, shè captured
some twenty-five prizes, most of which she torched and sunk.33
In November 1864, the Florida was captured by Union forces
and subsequently sank when a United States Army steamer
crashed into her.34
Even as the Florida campaigned on. the high seas, a second,
more modem Confederate cruiser, the C.S.S. Alabama, was
being built in the Liverpool Laird shipyards.35 Able to sail
swiftly under steam or sail or a combination of both; large
enough to sustain herself without frequent stops in port; armed
to take on warships as weIl as merchant vessels, the Alabama
was by' far' the most powerful of the Confederate cruisers.36
While allegedly taking some civilians on ,a triaI run, the Alabama, whose construction had been carefully tracked by British
and American officiaIs, left Liverpool on July 29, 1862.37 After
leaving her civilian passengers on a tug, the ship headed to the
Azores, where she was armed and put under the command of
Captain Raphael Semmes.38
30. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 284; SPENCER, supra note 24, at 34, 46.
31. Raphael Semmes, the future captain of the Alabama, was assigned command
of the Sumter in April 1961. SPENCER, supra note 24, at 32.
32. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 284.
33. HEARN, supra note 29, at 100. But see FOWLER, supra note 25, at 284
(stating that the Florida sunk 37 ships); SPENCER, supra note 24, at 165 (55 ships).
34. HEARN; supra note 29, at 148·52; FOWLER, supra note 25, at 284-86.
35. HEARN, supra note 29, at 102-09; FOWLER, supra note 25, at 286-87.
36. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 286-87. ·The Alabama was 230 feet in length, 32
foot in breadth, 20 foot in depth, and drew, when fully provisioned, 15 foot of water.
SEMMES, supra note 24, at 33.
37. EDNA BRADLOW & FRANK BRADLOW, HERE COMES THE ALABAMA 16 (1958);
FOWLER, supra note 25, at 287-88.
38. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 286-88. Sem~es had already achieved renown as
captain of the Sumter. See supra note 31 and accompanying texte Lieutenant John
McI1itosh Ken and most of the other officers on 'the Alabama had likewise served on
the Sumter. The rest of the Alabama's crew consisted largely of British sailors who
had been persuaded by promises of prize money to join Semmes. See BERN ANDER-
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The Alabama quickly lived up to Confederate expectations.
She took her first prize, the whaler Ocmulgee, on September 5,
1862, and set her afire. For nearly two weeks, until the whaling
season in the Azores drew to a close, the Alabama struck blow
after blow to the Northern whaling f1eet, destroying ten ships in
all. Because the oil from whales, which was used in lamps, was
in particularly great demand during wartime, the Northern
people keenly felt the effects of the Alabama's destruction. 39
The Alabama next headed to Newfoundland and then into the
Gulf of Mexico, making a number of captures on the way.40 In
the Gulf of Mexico, she engaged and defeated the U.S.S.
Hatteras, the only victory for a Confederate cruiser over a federal warship on the high seas. 41 She racked up an impressive list
of captures off the coast of Brazil and in the Indian Ocean, then
made her way in January 1864 to the Cape of Good Hope. 42
By 1864, the Alabama had done a stunning amount of damage to Northern commerce. She had captured and bumed fortysix United States ships, at an estimated cost to the United
States of more than $3,000,000.43 The ship herself was in dire
need of an overhauling-in almost two years on the high seas
she had never visited a Confederate port and taken the time for
major repairs-but her reputation was stronger than ever.44 In
Cape Town, Semmes proudly recounted in his memoirs "much
curiosity was manifested to see the ship .... [C]rowds gathered
to look curiously upon her and compare her appearance with
what they had read of her."45
The international press had followed the Alabama's every
move from afar, denouncing her tactics but conceding their effec-

SON, BY SEA AND BY RIVER 192 (1962).
39. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 288; HEARN, supra note 29, at 165-66; BRADLOW
& BRADLOW, supra note 37, at 32, 35.
40. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 288; see also HEARN, supra note 29, at 165-71
(documenting the capture of the Ocean Rouer, AZert, Starlight, Weathergauge,
Altamaha, Benjamin Tucker, Courser Virginia, and Elisha Dunbar).
41. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 288; HEARN, supra note 29, at 188.
42. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 288-89.
43. HEARN, supra note 29, at 195, 209.
44. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 366; HEARN, supra note 29, at 209; JOHN M.
TAYLOR, CONFEDERATE RAIDER: RAPHAEL SEMMES OF THE ALABAMA 193 (1994).
45. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 330.
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tiveness. 46 As he sailed away from the Cape of Good Hope towards Europe in 1864, Semmes was delighted to read in an
English newspaper a positive assessment of the Confederate
cruisers by the President of the British Board· of Trade. "According to his statistics," Semmes recounted, "we had destroyed, or
driven for protection under the English f1ag, in round numbers,
one-half of the enemy's ships engaged in the English trade. We
did even greater damage to the enemy's trade with other powers.m7 Buoyed by such assessments and yet alarmed by recent
Confederate reverses on land, Semmes headed for Cherbourg,
France, and what would be his final battle.46
. III. THE BA'ITLE OF THE ALABAMA. AND THE KEARSARGE
On June 11, 1864, the Alabama passed through the· English
Channel and entered the harbor of Cherbourg, France. Semmes
had intended to unload the prisoners from the last two merchant
ShipS49 which he had captured and burned en route from Cape
Town, to undertake a complete overhaul and repair of the Alabama, and to release his crew for a well-earned vacation.50 But
because the docks at Cherbourg were entirely state-owned,
Semmes first had to obtain the permission of the French govemment to dock his Ship.51 Unfortunately for Semmes, Emperor
Napoleon III was away at Biarritz in southem France and could
not be reached immediately to grant permis~ion for the Alabama
to dock. 52 It was this delay, and the French govemment's sub~
sequent decision not to allow Semmes to dock, that forced the
Alabama to remain anchored inside the Cherbourg harbor and
provided the Union with its long-awaited opportunity to put an
end to the Alabama's devastating exploits.
While the Alabama was heading for France, the Union man-

46. See BRADLOW & BRADLOW, supra note 37, at 36-37.
47. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 364.
48. See SEMMES, supra note 24, at 362, 366.
49. The Rockingham and Tycoon were the Alabama's final prizes. See BRADLOW
& BRADLOW, supra note 37, at 98.
50. See BRADLOW & BRADLOW, supra note 37, at 98.
51. See BEARN, supra note 29, at 221; BRADLOW & BRADLOW, supra note 37, at
98.
52. BEARN, supra note 29, at 221.
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of-war, U.S.S. Kearsarge, was on dutY in the English Channel.
This third-rate "screw-sloop,,,63 considered too slow for blockade
duty, was sent to the North Atlantic to track down Confederate
raiders. 64 In September 1863 it arrived at the harbor of Brest,
France, to watch over the Florida, which was docked there for
repairs. 55 The Kearsarge's captain, John A. Winslow, spent the
next nine months patrolling the French harbors at Brest,
Cherbourg, and Calais to prevent Confederate vessels docked
there from leaving. 56 In June 1864 the Kearsarge was positioned in the English Channel watching over the Confederate
cruiser C.S.S. Rappahannock which was docked in the harbor off
Calais awaiting further orders. 57 Upon hearing of the
Alabama's proximity, Winslow moved his patrol to Cherbourg.
Arriving on June 14, 1864, and positioning the Kearsarge just
inside Cherbourg harbor, Winslow was prepared to prevent the
Alabama from leaving the harbor. 56 Instead, Semmes decided to
do baUle and communicated his intentions to Winslow. 69
On June 19, 1864, after preparing for battle, the Alabama
steamed out of Cherbourg harbor, accompanied into international waters by the French iron-clad frigate Couronne. 60 In the
preceding days the news of the coming battle had circulated
throughout France. Thousands of onlookers arrived and lined
the harbor to watch the battle. One spectator, John Lancaster,
an Englishman vacationing with his family, sailed his yacht, the
Deerhound, out of the harbor ahead of the Alabama to position
her within close range of the battle site. 61

53. SPENCER, supra note 24, at 169.
54. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 290; HEARN, supra note 29, at 37.
55. HEARN, supra note 29, at 111.
56. SPENCER, supra note 24, at 169.
57. SPENCER, supra note 24, at 184.
58. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 368; Report from Captain John A. Winslow ta
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (June 19, 1864), in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF THE REBELLION 59 (Series 1
1896) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS].
59. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 368.
60. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 370-71. The French were greatly concerned with
maintaining their neutrality and were determined that the battle not occur in
French waters. See SPENCER, supra note 24, at 10-13; SEMMES, supra note 24, at
370.
61. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 371. It was the Deer1wund that rescued Captain
Semmes after the battle. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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The battle that ensued was quick and decisive. When the
Alabama was seven miles from the shore, the Kearsarge, ready
and waiting, turned and steamed directly toward her. When the
Kearsarge was about one mile away, the Alabama opened tire. 52
The Kearsarge stopped her approach at about 900 yards and
returned tire.63 Both ships fought with their starboard batteries
throughout the battle.64 Although on the surface it appeared
that the warships were almost equally matched, 65 the
Kearsarge had a secret weapon. Concealed on its hull under
wooden planking lay rows of iron chain mail. This armor made
the Kearsarge virtually impervious to the raking tire of the
Alabama's battery, causing most of the shots to ricochet off the
.
ship and land in the sea. 66
For a little over an hour the ships fought in circles moving
westward around a common center with their broadsides facing
each other. 67 Finally, as the tires on the Alabama were rapidly
being extinguished by the water pouring into the engine room,
Captain Semmes made one last attempt to turn and head for
neutral waters but was cut off by the Kearsarge which quickly
positioned herself between the sinking ship and the shore. Recognizing defeat and sinking fast, the Alabama lowered her flag
62. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 372-73; Report of Captain John A. Winslow to
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (July 30, 1864), in 3 OmcIAL RECORDS, supra
note 58, at 79..
63. Report of Captain John A. Winslow to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles
(July 30, 1864), in 3 OmcIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at 79.
64.. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 373.
65. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 369. The Alabama had 149 crewmen and eight
guns (six 32-pounders, one 8-inch, and one rifled 100-pounder) and the Kearsarge
had approximately 160 crewmen and seven guns (two Il-inch, one 28-pounder rifle,
and four light 32-pounder guns). Report of Captain John A. Winslow to Secretary of
the Navy Gideon Welles (June 20, 1864), in 3 OmcIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at
59. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 369.
66. One shell from the Alabama lodged in the stern post of the Kearsarge and,
but for a defect in its cap, might have proven fatal had it exploded. Report of
Captain John A. Winslow to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles (June 20, 1864),
in 3 OmCIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at 59; SEMMES, supra note 24, at 378. In his
memoirs, Semmes proudly asserts that this shell was the only trophy that the enemy ever got from the Alabama. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 762. Never did he
suspect that over a century Iater, another trophy from the Alabama would find. its
way into the hands of the federaI govemment.
67. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 373; Report of Captain John A. Winslow to
Secrequy of the Navy Gideon Welles (July 30, 1864), in 3 OmcIAL RECORDS, supra
note 58, at 79.
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and raised the white flag of surrender. 68 Semmes wrote in his
memoirs that even after this offer of surrender, the Kearsarge
fired upon the Alabama. Winslow, by contrast, claimed that
after the Alabama's flag was lowered, the Alabama continued to
fire. Fearing sorne ruse, Winslow did not let up until he saw the
Alabama's lifeboats 10wered. 69
As the ship went down, the wounded were lowered into
boats and Semmes gave the order "Every man save himself who
can!"70 Semmes described the descent of the Alabama:
A noble Roman once stabbed his daughter, rather than she should
be polluted by the fouI embrace of a tyrant. It was with a similar
feeling that Kell and l saw the Alabama go down. We had buried
her as we had christened her, and she was safe from the polluting
touch of the hated Yankee!71

No one from the Kearsarge ever boarded the Alabama, so as she
sank she carried to a watery grave aIl of her cargo and accouterments. 72
Semmes and thirty-nine of his crew were picked out of the
water by the English yacht Deerhound which, much to the surprise of Captain Winslow, then turned toward England and
ferried its soggy passengers to freedom in Southampton.
Semmes was feted by the English and subsequently promoted to
Admiral by the Confederacy.73 The remaining prisoners were
taken back to France and paroled by Winslow who claimed he
had neither the room nor the men necessary to guard them. 74
For this he was roundly reprimanded by the United States Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles:
In paroling the prisoners, however, you [Winslow] committed

68. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 373.
69. Report of Captain John A. Winslow te Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles
(June 21, 1864), in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at 60. For these conflicting

accounts, compare Report of Captain John A. Winslow te Secretary of the Navy
Gideon WeIIes (July 30, 1864), in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at 80 with
SEMMES, supra note 24, at 373.
70. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 379.
71. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 381.
72. See SEMMES, supra note 24, at 375.
73. SPENCER, supra note 24, at 189-90; SEMMES, supra note 24, at 374.
74. Report of Captain John A. Winslow te Secretary of the Navy Gideon WeIIes
(July 30, 1864), in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at 78.

Poser & Varon in Alabama Law Review (Spring 1995), v. 46, no. 3. Copyright 1995, Alabama Law Review. Used by permission.

1995]

United States v. Steinmetz

737

a grave error. The Alabama was an English-built vessel, armed
and manned by Englishmen; has never had any other than an
English register; has never sailed undér any recognized national
flag sinee she left the shores of England; has never visited any
port of North America, and her career of devastation sinee she
went forth from England is one that does not entitle those of her
crew who were captured to be paroled. This Department expressly
disavows that Act. Extreme caution must be exercised that we in
no way change the character of this English-built and Englishmanned, if not English-owned, vessel, or relieve those who may
be implicated in sending forth this robber upon the seas from any
responsibility to which they may be liable for the outrages she
has committed.75

Nevertheless, Captain Winslow was promoted to the rank of
Commodore and continued his watch over Confederate vessels in
Europe for the balance of the war. 76 Within a year of the sinking of the Alabama, the Civil War ended and the belligerents
began the slow and painful process of reconstructing the nation.
IV. THE

ODYSSEY OF THE ALABAMA'S BELL

In 1979, Richard Steinmetz, an antique dealer from
Westwood, New Jersey, was in England at an antique gun show
when another dealer approached him and told him that he knew
the whereabouts of the bell from the Confederate raider Alabama.77 His. curiosity piqued, Steinmetz traveled to Hastings,
England, where he saw the bell, inscribed with C.S.S. Alabama,
and received documentation as to its authenticity. Steinmetz
went to great lengths to confirm. the authenticity of the bell. He
traveled to Greenwich where he studied the plans of the Ala<

75. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles ta Captain John A. Winslow (July 12, 1864), in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at 75. This interpretation of Britain's responsibility for the devastation visited upon American interests
during the war by the Alabama formed the basis for the United States's recovery of
$15.5 million awarded by the Geneva tribunal which arbitrated the famous Alabama
Claims case. J.G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
671-77 (2d ed. 1964).
.
76. See Letter of Acting Master Sumner ta the President of the United States
(Feb. 23, 1865), in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at 82.
77. United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
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bama and to Guernsey to interrogate local residents. 7S
He was told that in 1936 a fisherman named Lawson from
the Isle of Guernsey, one of the British Channel Islands off the
western coast of France, dove down and retrieved the brass bell
from the Alabama.79 With war rumors in the air, the demand
for certain metals was high and Guernsey fishermen found it
more profitable to strip brass and copper from sunken wrecks
than to ply the sea for haddock. 80 Lawson, however, apparently
traded the bell for drinks at a local bar. The bar was subsequently bombed by the British when Guernsey fell into German
hands during World War II. After the war, the bell was once
again salvaged and exchanged hands until it ended up with an
antique dealer in Hastings, England. s1 The information
Steinmetz gathered, together with the condition and style of the
bell and the fact that it was covered with nicotine (which was
consistent with its sojoum in an English pub) convinced him of
its authenticity.s2 He then obtained the bell in a barter deal for
approximately $12,000 worth of antique guns. 83
Upon his retum to the United States, Steinmetz offered the
bell to the United States Naval Academy, but the Academy was
not in a financial position to purchase it. Eleven years later,
Steinmetz decided to put the bell up for auction at the Harmer
Rooke Gallery in Manhattan. 54 The gallery placed a full-page
advertisement for the item in its catalogue. 85 This time, the
United States Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C.,
learned of the auction and immediately claimed that the bell
was the property of the United States. S6 The bell was delivered
over to the district court in New Jersey and litigation ensued.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. United States v. Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 (D.N.J. 1991), affd,
973 F.2d 212 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
81. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 215.
82. Tranacript of Summary Judgment Proceedings at 64, United' States v.
Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1991) (90-5036), affd, 973 F.2d 212 (3d Ciro
1992), ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
83. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 215.
84. Id.
85. United States V. Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. 1293, 1297 {D.N.J. 1991), affd,
973 F.2d 212 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
86. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 315.
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At that time, there had been no formal determination as to
the authenticity of the bell. Steinmetz clearly had been convinced of its authenticity when he bough~ it. The government,
presumably in order to insure that it would own this potentiaIly
significant artifact, stipùlated to the authenticity of the bell for
the purposes of litigation. Later evidence, however, has cast
sorne doubt upon its authenticity, and there are ongoing efforts
to make a final determination.S7 Because of the stipulation,
however, the issue of authenticity was neither briefed by the
parties nor addressed by the courts.
At trial, the government made two arguments for its rightful ownership of the bell. First, it argued that the Alabama was
captured by the Kearsarge and therefore the Confederate vessel
and aIl its property onboard passed to the United States at the
87. There are a number of factors which raise questions about the bell's authenticity. First, it is only about one foot high. On a 230 foot ship, such a bell might
not serve its presumed purpose of infonning the crew of the hours of the day.
Second, although the bell is engraved with the words "C.S.S. Alabama," it is unlikely that it was made or engraved in the Liverpool shipyard where the Alabama was
constructecl: This fact, however, can be reconciled with the secrecy involved in the
construction of Confederate warships. It is quite plausible that the beIl would have
been constructed and engraved elsewhere and then put on the Alabama after con·
struction, possibly in the Azores, where the ship taok on its crew, or in Brazil or
Capetown. In addition, there is a person in England who apparently is cIaiming to
have duped Mr. Steinmetz into buying the beIl by, among other things, drawing up
false papers. The veracity of his cIaims, however, has not been fuIly investigated.
Letter from Dr. WiIIiam S. Dudley, Senior Historian, Naval Historica1 Center, to
Susan Poser (Apr. 11, 1995) (on file with the Alabama Law Review).
The Navy Museum at the Naval Historica1 Center, located at the Washington
Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., where the beIl is currently on display, is investigating these issues and is in the process of gathering evidence in an attempt to
make a determination as to the beIl's authenticity. The investigation is under the di·
rection of the Center's senior historian, Dr. William S. Dudley.
MeanwhiIe, a French maritime archaeologica1 team bas been recovering pieces
of the Alabama and its cargo since 1984. In 1988, the C.S.S. Alabama Association,
consisting of French and American experts, was fonned under the auspices of the
French Ministry of Culture and Communication to oversee the archaeological expedition. These recovery efforts were recently chronicled in an article entitled "The
Wreck of the C.S.S. Alabama, Avenging Angel of the Confederacy," in National
Geographie, December 1994. The French archaeologist leading the recovery efforts,
retired French Navy Captain Max Guérout, had enough doubt about the authenticity
of the beIl that he made no reference to it in the article, going so far as to state
that "[fJor 120 years the Alabama was considered lost. The water was tao deep, the
currents tao wicked, to consider salvage." Max Guérout, The Wreck of the C.S.S.
Alabama, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIe, Dec. 1994, at 69. The recovery efforts have not to
date, however, recovered a beIl.
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time of the battle. 88 Alternatively, the government contended
that even if the fact that the Alabama sank without ever having
been boarded by Union forces precluded a capture, the ship and
its accouterments, the property of the Confederacy at the time of
its sinking, automaticaHy became the property of the United
States at the end of the Civil War by operation of the doctrine of
succession. S9 It is the latter doctrine, on which the court of appeals based its affirmance of the district court's judgment for the
government,90 with which this Article is primarily concerned.
In his appeal, Steinmetz countered the government's succession argument by contending that the Alabama was, by aH Union accounts, not Confederate property but rather a privately
owned pirate vessel and therefore not subject to the doctrine of
succession. 91 Further, Steinmetz argued, even if the Confederacy did own the Alabama, the succession doctrine applies only to
sovereign nations. 92 Because the Confederacy never acquired
the status of a sovereign nation in the eyes of the Union, he
argued, the succession doctrine was not applicable. 93
88. Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. at 1297·98.
89. Id. at 1298.
90. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 223. The district court found for the government on
bath theories, accepting the government's argument that the Kearsarge, by positioning herself between the Alabama and the harbor and thereby preventing any escape
by the Alabama before it sank, was in "constructive possession" of the Alabama.
Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. at 1298. AB the appeals court noted, however, the theory of
constructive possession had never been endorsed by a court in a situation in which
a certain sign of surrender was not followed by actual possession of the vessel.
Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 217 (distinguishing The Rebeckah, 165 Eng. Rep. 158 (1799)
and The Alexander, 1 F. Cas. 357 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 164), affd, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 169 (1814». Moreover, although the various accounts are conflicting, it is
possible that Captain Winslow's fear that Semmes was not surrendering but rather
attempting sorne ruse de guerre in lowering his colora, may have been well·founded.
Semmes himself suggested that he did make one attempt ta escape ta shore. See
SEMMES, supra note 24, at 384. He also stated that in striking his flag, he had
merely offered surrender, which offer was never accepted because the Alabama sank
tao quickly. See SEMMES, supra note 24, at 384. If there was no real surrender, then
the government's theory of constructive capture must necessarily fail. See Steinmetz,
973 F.2d at 217.
AB credibility deterrninations were impossible for the court ta make concerning
the accounts of an event that occurred 130 years ago and were surely "skewed by
unspent passions" of the participants, Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 214, the court of
appeals was wise ta avoid making a deterrnination of the capture issue.
91. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 218.
92. Id. at 220.
93. Id. at 218.
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The government's succession argument forced the courts
that heard this case to confront two fundamental questions central to the uncertain legal nature of the Civil War. First, were
the Confederates on the high seas enemies or pirates? Second,
how should the property amassed by the Confederacy over a
four-year period be treated once the Confederacy was declared a
nullity?

v.

SUCCESSION

A The Question ofPiracy

The essence of Steinmetz's piracy argument was that the
Alabama was the private property of traitors to the United
States, traitors whof)e actions cIearly defined them as pirates.94
To designate the Alabama as a pirate vessel is, Steinmetz argued, to remain true to the rhetoric and policies of the federal
government itself, which repeatedly characterized Confederate
raiders as pirates, passed an antipiracy act, and even brought to
trial Confederate seamen on charges of piracy. If the Alabama
was not public property, he furtherargued, then the United
States government had no cIaim to it and could not invoke the
rule of succession as a justification for seizing the Alabama's
bell.95
Steinmetz mustered considerable historical evidence to support his assertion that the Alabama was a pirate vesseI.
Throughout the war, Union officiaIs and the Northern press
made it their practice to refer to aIl Confederate ships as pirate
ships. On April 19, 1861, as President Lincoln announced the
Union blockade of the South, he declared that aD those who
acted under the "pretended authority" of the Confederacy to
"molest a vessel of the United States" would be prosecuted under piracy laws.96 That is, rather than being treated as prison-

94. Id. Piracy has been defined as an act of aggression unauthorized by the law
of nations and "utterly without sanction from public authority or sovereign power."
Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); see 61 AM. JUR. 2D
Piracy § 6 (1987).
95. 8teinmetz, 973 F.2d at 218.
96. Proclamation No. 4, 12 Stat. 1258, 1259 (1861); see supra text accompanying
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ers of war and paroled, exchanged, or imprisoned according to
international law and custom, Confederate seamen would be
tried for the capital crime of piracy, and if found guilty, would
be executed. 97
Congress followed Lincoln's lead with its enactment of "An
Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States and Punish
the Crime of Piracy."9S The Act provided that captured Confederate commerce raiders were to be treated as pirate ships and
established procedures by which such captured vessels would be
condemned in United States courts before they legally became
Union property.99 Secretary of State William Seward and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles repeatedly referred to the Alabama as a pirate ship, and when Congress passed its resolution
honoring Captain Winslow and the Kearsarge, it praised him for
having brought down "the piratical craft 'Alabama. '"100 The
Northern press considered the Alabama's British origin proof of
its piratical status. 101 The characterization of his men as pirates vexed the Alabama's Captain Semmes, who wrote bitterly
in his memoirs that "[t]hey could as logically have called General Robert E. Lee a bandit as myself a pirate; but logic was not
the forte of the enemy, either during or since the late war."102
His bitterness notwithstanding, Semmes must have known
that the Union rhetoric did have a certain political logic. 103

note 16.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 112·37.
98. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 48, 12 Stat. 314.
99. Ch. 48, § 2, 12 Stat. 314.
100. H.R.J. Res. 3, 13 Stat. 565 (1864). Seward based his charge of piracy on ms
belief that the Alabama was English property (having been built in an English port);
she was in his mind not a Confederate warship but a "British pirate." BRADLOW &
BRADLOW, supra note 37, at 18; see Report of Captain John A. Winslow to Secretary
of the Navy Gideon Welles (July 8, 1864), in 3 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 58, at
74.
101. TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 129.
102. SEMMES, supra note 24, at 45.
103. Notably, there were also commercial ramifications in the charges of piracy
leveled against Confederate seamen. Since many of the insurance policies at the
time contained piracy clauses, owners of ships harmed by Confederate raiders tried
to use the govemment's rhetoric to their advantage. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. As Taylor explains: "[S]kippers and shipping companies alike sought to
collect on their policies to no avail. The owner of the first ship Semmes [as captain
of the Sumter] had bumed, the Golden Rocket, had sued for compensation under a
piracy clause but had lost in both state and federal courts." TAYLOR, supra note 54,
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That rhetoric was intended to erase the customary line of distinction between pirates, privateers, and raider13 (cruisers). Unlike pirates, who acted "without authority from any prince or
state," privateers and cruisers, by definition, acted under the
authority of sovereign states and obeyed the rules of war. 104 By
designating Confederate ships as pirates and not privateers or
cruisers, the Union sought to deny the legitimacy of the Confederacy. The term pirate was in essence a weapon in the battle for
public opinion-to paint the Confederates as traitors and ruthless pirates would, Union leaders hoped, thwart Southem attempts to eam sympathy in the North and to win foreign recognition.los
Contrary to Northem rhetoric, or perhaps because of it, the
Confederate government was very careful to establish its naval
force legally and formally. In May 1861, the Confederate Congress authorized privateering-the destruction of private property at sea by privately armed vessels operating under a "letter of
marque" or authorization from the Confederate government.106
In order to regulate privateering, the Confederate government
instructed privateers to bring their captured prizes to Confederate admiralty courts, where the claims of the various parties to
a given capture could be adjudicated. l07 While Confederate privateers such as the Savannah and the Jefferson Davis did strike
fear into the hearts of Northemers, privateering ultimately
proved, because of the efi'ectiveness of the Union blockade, to
have little impact on the progress of the war. 10S
Far more dev~stating to Northem fortunes were the actions
of cruisers such as the Alabama. 109 In contrast to privateers,
cruisers were "owned by the government, and they were commanded by naval officers acting under a genuine commission."110 Not only is it clear that the Confederacy financed the
at 129. See infra note 133.
104. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1134, 1135 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No.
16,318); see TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 56.
105. See TAYLOR, supra note 44, at 71, 116.
106. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 43-44.
107. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 43-45; FOWLER, supra note 25, at 278. In 1863
the United States Congress passed a bill allowing President Lincoln ta issue letters
of marque ta Union privateers. See BRADLOW & BRADLOW, supra note 37, at 35.
108. FOWLER, supra note 25, at 278-79; ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 43-45.
109. See ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 45.
110. 12 CONFEDERATE MILITARY HIsToRY 99 (Clement A. Evans ed., 1899); see
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building of raiders like the Alabama, but it is also clear that
Semmes operated under a commission and that the Alabama
sailed under a Confederate flag. lll During the Civil War, the
United States government persistently refused to recognize
those facts in its rhetoric, for to do so would be to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the Confederate navy and, by extension, of the
Confederacy itself.
One irony of the Steinmetz case is that the present-day
position of the United States with regard to Confederate sovereignty directly contradicts its Civil War era rhetoric. In the
Steinmetz case, the United States based one of its claims to
ownership of the Alabama's ben on the assertion that the Alabama was-just as Semmes argued-indeed the public property
of a legitimate nation, the Confederate States of America, and
not a privately owned pirate vessel. Steinmetz contended, by
contrast, that the United States had a legal obligation to uphold
its wartime position. He argued for a consistency between Union
wartime rhetoric and policy, reasoning that Union policies and
laws, in harmony with Union rhetoric, designated Confederate
vessels as piratical. 112
Were the Union's policies with regard to COnfederate pirates
in fact in harmony with its rhetoric? The Steinmetz court answered this question in the negative, concluding that the
Union's "references to piracy were more rhetorical than legal."113 The Union did expend sorne effort backing up and enforcing its rhetoric about piracy. This effort included the prosecution of a number of Confederate crews for piracy. But rather
than supporting Steinmetz's position, the outcomes of these
trials demonstrate the motivation behind the piracy charges and
the unwillingness of the Union, for political reasons, to carry the
rhetoric to its logical conclusion. The most famous pirate trial,
that of the crew of the C.S.S. Savannah, illustrates the gap between Union rhetoric and policy that typified the Union's dual
theory of the war.
On the afternoon of June 4, 1861, the Confederate privateer
supra text accompanying notes 30-48.
111. HEARN, supra note 29, at 153-60.
112. United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 218-20 (3d Ciro 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
113. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 218-20.
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Savannah, wbich had earlier captured the Union brig Joseph,
was itself captured by the Union warsbip U.S.S. Perry. The thirty-two members of the Savannah's crew were sent to New York,
where they awaited trial on charges of piracy. Upon their arrival
in New York, the pirates were marched in irons to the city jail,
the Tombs, wbile a fascinated public watched from streets and
windows. Throughout their stay at the Tombs, the pirates were
objects of great media attention and public curiosity.114
On July 6, 1861, two weeks after the prisoners' ignominious
arrival in New York, Confederate President Jefferson Davis
angrily responded to the incident, writing to Lincoln:
[T]his Government will deal out ta the prisoners held by it,
the same treatment and the same fate as shall be experienced by
those captured on the Savannah; and if driven ta the terrible
necessity of retaliation, by your execution of any of the officers or
crew of the Savannah, that retaliation will be extended so far as
shall be requisite ta secure the abandonment of a practice unknown ta the warfare of civilized man, and so barbarous, as ta
disgrace the nation which shall be guilty of inaugurating it. 1l6

The essence of Davis's complaint was that the Savannah's
seamen, incarcerated in a civilian jail and not a military one,
were being treated as criminals and not as prisoners of war.
Davis's letter was a tacit recognition that the United States did
generally treat captive Confederate soldiers (as opposed to sailors) as prisoners of war, and thereby granted the Confederacy
some de facto belligerent rights. Treatment of prisoners of war
was relatively lenient in the first year of the war. Interrogations
were often "gentle affairs," and it was common for a prisoner to
be paroled pending an exchange-to be released.ifhe vowed not
to return to fighting until li prisoner on bis own side had been
released. The treatment of prisoners deteriorated as the war
progressed, giving rise to prison camps such as Andersonville, a
Confederate facility in Georgia infamous for its brutal conditions. 116

114. WILLIAM M. RoBINSON, JR., THE CONFEDERATE PRIvATEERS 49-57 (1928).
115. 2 ALExANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTlTUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR
BE'lWEEN THE STATES 432-33 (1870) (quoting letter of Jefferson Davis).
116. See GERALD F. LINDERMAN, EMBATTLED COURAGE: THE ExP~RIENCE OF
COMBAT IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 14-15, 237-38 (1987).

Poser & Varon in Alabama Law Review (Spring 1995), v. 46, no. 3. Copyright 1995, Alabama Law Review. Used by permission.

748

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 46:3:725

Davis's letter never received an official answer. ll7 Ten
days after he sent it, an indictment was handed down, charging
the imprisoned privateers with ten counts of piracy in the cap~
ture of the Joseph. llS Before the United States Circuit Court
for the Southern District of New York, the prisoners pIed not
guilty to each of the counts, the conviction on any one of which
was punishable, under a 1790 Act of Congress on piracy, by
death. 1l9 Although the government wanted to try the case immediately to set an example for others undertaking "treason and
piracy," the defense counsel, led by Algernon Sidney Sullivan
and Daniel Lord, convinced the judge to continue the case until
the faH term. The trial was set for late October. 120
In October 1861, the case of the Savannah pirates went to
trial. 121 The trial lasted for eight days under intense scrutiny
from the press and the public. 122 The government's case was
based on its claim that by capturing the Joseph, Captain Thomas Harrison Baker and the rest of the Savannah's crew had
committed acts of piracy and treason in violation of federal
law. l23 The prosecution's argument was based on a denial of
Confederate legitimacy.l24
According to the defense, the crewmen were privateers because they operated under a letter of marque from a legitimate
government. They had duly condemned the captured Joseph in
an admiralty court in Charleston, South Carolina, and they
showed none of the animo furandi, or intent to steal, that was
required for piracy convictions. The defense argued in essence
that "the attack on the brig Joseph was a belligerent act and not
a piratical one."l25
Mer an eight-day trial and twenty hours of deliberations,

117. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 134.
118. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 133-37; John D. Gordan, III, The Trial of the
Officers and Crew of the Schooner "Savannah," in SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL
SOCIETY YEARBOOK 34 (1983).
119. ROBINSON, supra note 114, at 137, 140.
120. Gordan, supra note 118, at 35.
121. Gordan, supra note 118, at 38.
122. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 146-47.
123. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 142.
124. See RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 142 (stating that the prosecution never
recognized the Confederacy as a separate nation).
125. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 142, 144-45.
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the jury could not agree on a verdict. 126 Since the prospect of a
break in its deadlock was dim, the jury was dismissed and a
retrial was set for the next terme The case was never retried. 127
The fallure of the jury-made up of the Northern merchants
whom privateering did most ta hurt128-to return a guilty verdict is difficult to explain considering the fact that just a few
days before its deliberations, guilty verdicts were handed down
at siniilar piracy trials in Philadelphia.129 Those trials concerned the most successful privateer of the war, the Confederate
brig Jefferson Davis. 1so On July 6, 1861, the Jefferson Davis
had captured the Northern schooner Enchantress. l3l The Enchantress was put under the command of prizemaster William
W. Smith and a small prize crew. Their plan ta take the Enchantress ta Charleston went awry on July 22 when the Enchantress was retaken by the U.S.S. Albatross. Smith and his
men were charged with piracy upon their arrival at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. On October 22, the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania heard the
case of United States v. Smith and after deliberating for four
days, delivered a guilty verdict. 132 On October 28, three members of Smith's crew were likewise convicted; a third trial acquit. ted another.member of the crew who proved his loyalty ta the
United States. l33

126. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 146-47; Gordan, supra note 118, at 40.
127. Gordan, supra note 118, at 39-40.
128. Gordan, supra note 118, at 40.
129. Gordan, supra note 118, at 41; ROBINSON, supra note 114, at 147.
130. Gordan, supra note 118, at 41; ROBINSON, supra· note 114, at 147-48.
131. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 69.
132. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 69, 84, 147-48.
133. RoBINSON, supra note 114, 147-48. Shortly after the capture of the Enchant·
ress, another pme of the Jefferson Davis, the S.J. Waring, was recaptured by Union
forces. Norman C. Delaney, Privateers in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONFEDERACY
1269 (1993). The captured privateersmen aboard the S.J. Waring were charged with
piracy, but like the men from the Enchantress they were eventually transferred from
civil to military prisons. Id.
The ambiguous Iegal status of the Confederate raiders was alljudicated in
another Iegal forum as weIl. In a number of cases involving insurance claims for the
damage inflicted on Union merchant vessels by the Confederate raiders, various
state courts had to determine whether capture by commissioned Confederate vessels
fit into a provision in many policies which provided coverage for acts of piracy.
These courts took a naturalist view of the war, finding that whether the raiders
were called pirates or not, a war .existed in fact and therefore the taking of a ship

Poser & Varon in Alabama Law Review (Spring 1995), v. 46, no. 3. Copyright 1995, Alabama Law Review. Used by permission.

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 46:3:725

Why did the New York jury not reach the same resuIt as the
Philadelphia jury? Legal scholar John D. Gordan, III attributes
the hung jury in the Savannah case to the efforts of Justice
Samuel Nelson, who sat on the panel of judges that heard the
case. lM Justice Nelson's instructions to the jury virtually conceded that the privateers were not pirates according to the "common law of nations" and implied that the indicted men couId be
convicted only if it was shown that they had acted for personal
gain rather than as combatants. 135 Gordan specuIates that Justice Nelson's political allegiance to the Democratie party might
have clouded his legal judgment. Justice Nelson's behavior
stands in sharp contrast to that of Justice Robert C. Grier, who
presided over the Jefferson Davis case. 136 Gordan contends that
Justice Grier, by defining piracy broadly, made it easier for the
jury to convict. 137
Clearly, the resuIts of the Savannah and Jefferson Davis
trials did not settle the question of whether Confederate ships
were pirate ships. The Jefferson Davis convictions and the very
fact of the Savannah trial certainly provide sorne support for
Steinmetz's characterization of Union policies, while the hung
jury in the Savannah case suggests that the Union's piracy
argument was not entirely persuasive, even to Northerners.
What the Steinmetz court found more compelling than the trial
results as grounds for resolving the piracy issue were Union
actions in the aftermath of the verdicts. l38 Although death was

in the prosecution of the war amounted ta a capture. See, e.g., Fitfield v. Insurance
Co., 47 Pa. 166 (1864) (arising out of the Jefferson Davis incident where the court
found that a capture had occurred because a de facto war existed, despite the prior
conviction of the crew of the Jefferson Davis for piracy). Thus, courts like Fitfield
"appl[ied] the labeling system it construed out of the actions of a poliey-making
branch of govemment overruling the judiciary in the very fact situation before the
court." ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAw OF PIRACY 178 (1988). See also supra note 103.
134. Gordan, supra note 118, at 40-41.
135. Gordan, supra note 118, at 40.
136. Gordan, supra note 118, at 41.
137. Gordan, supra note 118, at 41. In November 1861 four members of the crew
of the captured Confederate privateer Petrel were charged with bath piraey and
trea80n; though indicted by a grand jury, they were never tried. RoBINSON, supra
note 114, at 150-51. Ailer the Petrel hearing, there were no additional piraey trials.
RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 150-51.
138. United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 218-19 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
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the recognized penalty for piracy, the convicted crew members
from the Jefferson Davis were not executed. In fact, none of the
Confederate seamen convicted of piracy during the war was ever
executed. 139
Confederate President Jefferson Davis made sure that the
consequences of any such executions would be severe. Shortly
after he learned of the results of the Philadelphia and New York
trials, Davis retaliated against Union threats. On November 9,
1861, he ordered the Confederate War Department to select
fourteen high-ranking prisoners of war, one for every imprisoned
privateersman, and to incarcerate them as "convicted felons."
They were to remain in prison until the Confederate seamen
were released. One Union man would be executed for every
Confederate prisoner put to death. l40
Davis's threat had the intended effect. In February 1862 all
of the imprisoned privateers were transferred from the common
jails to military prisons. Eventually they were exchanged and
sent home. 141
Captain Winslow of the Kearsarge was even m9re lenient to
the men he captured in his battle with the Alabama-he paroled
and released most of them. Much to the dismay of NayY Secretary Welles, Winslow allowed Semmes and the other principal
officers of the Alabama to be rescued by the English yacht
Deerhound and therefore escape capture and possible prosecution by the Union. Although Semmes had so often been called a
pirate by the Union authorities, and although Welles sought to
arrest him as one, Semmes was never prosecuted for piracy after
the war. He received a full pardon in 1866 under President Andrew Johnson's lenient Reconstruction policies. 142
The 8teinmetz court found that the fate of the so-called
pirates aboard Confederate ships like the Alabama demonstrates
that the Confederacy possessed de facto belligerent rights, both
in the eyes of the Union and in the eyes of the world. l43 President Lincoln had, for all .intents and purposes, recognized that
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
113 S.

RANDALL, supra note 10, lit 66.
RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 148-49.
RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 150-51.
HEARN, supra note 29, at 231·35.
See United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri. denied,
Ct. 1578 (1993).
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belligerency the moment he imposed the blockade in 1861. Solicitor of the Navy Department John Bolles acknowledged after the
war that the blockade itself had tied the Union's hands with
respect to the Confederate pirates:
By establishing a blockade of Confederate ports, our Government
had recognized the Confederates as belligerents, if not as a belligerent state, and had thus confessed that Confederate officers and
men, military or naval, could not be treated as pirates or guerrillas, so long as they obeyed the laws ofwar. 144

Furthermore, members of the international community,
including England, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Brazil,
all recognized the belligerency of the Confederacy.145 The piracy trials were condemned in the British Rouse of Lords as contrary to internationallaw and the Lord Chancellor stated that if
the United States government executed privateersmen as pirates
it would be "guilty of murder.,,146 The notion that international
pressure helped to mold Union policy with regard to captured
sailors is best summed up by historian J.G. Randall:
From every standpoint it was found impolitic and indeed
impossible to carry out this policy of punishing for piracy those
who were in the Confederate service. It is thoroughly recognized
in international law that those who operate at sea under the
authority of an organized responsible government observing the
rules of war may not be treated as pirates. Internationally, the
Confederacy was a recognized belligerent, and to have its ships
deemed piratical under the jus gentium was entirely out of the
question. 147

Moreoever,

as Confederate Vice President Alexander

144. 2 JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 330, at 1082-83
(1906).
145. 1 JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 66, at 184-86 (1906).
146. RoBINSON, supra note 114, at 135 (citation omitted).
147. RANDALL, supra note 10, at 65-66. This view is supported by Rubin who
concludes:
This approach, essentially leaving it to each municipal legal system to attach
legal words of art as it chooses for policy reasons, and referring questions of
legal policy within the American legal system to the arms of the government
given policy discretion by the American Constitution, amounts to a total denial
of the existence of any "international law" of "piracy." "Piracy jure gentium"
seems to have become a conception of each state's municipal law to Dana.
RUBIN, supra note 133, at 184.
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Stephens wrote alter the war, whether fear of Confederate reprisals, a recognition of international law, or a "sense of humanity"
ultimately shaped Union policies, such motivations will "he leit
forever ta conjecture."l48 However, it is perfectly clear, as the
Steinmetz court concluded, that the Alabama was not in any
practical sense a piratical vessel. 149

B. Ownership of the Bell
Having determined that the Alabama was the property of
the Confederacy and not a piratical vessel, the Steinmetz court
turned ta the question of whether the United States succeeded
ta the ownership of the Alabama at the close of the Civil War.
Steinmetz made two principal arguments against succession: First, since the Union never recognized the Confederacy as
a sovereign nation, succession, as it was defined in international
law, could not occur. l50 Alternatively, Steinmetz argued that,
according ta the doctrine of succession, in order for the United
States to have succeeded ta the property of the Confederacy, it
must also have succeeded to its debts and liabilities. 151 Section
Four of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, clearly states that
the United States would not take on any of the debts of the Confederacy.152 Therefore, the succession doctrine could not operate between the United States and the Confederacy.
The 8teinmetz court approached the question of the degree
of sovereignty possessed by the de facto Confederate govemment
by exploring the ambiguity in the succession doctrine and the
various federal cases decided during and alter the Civil War
that dealt with the doctrine's application in this contexte The
court concluded that the succession doctrine was broad enough
148. STEPHENS, supra note 115, at 434.
149. United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 220 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
150. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 220. It is dear that the Confederacy was considered
enough of an identifiable entity ta he able ta own property. See Whitfield v. United
States, 92 U.S. 165, 169 (1876).
151. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 221.
152. U.S. CONST. amende XIV, § 4. The amendment states: "[N]either the United
States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rehellion against the United States, . • . but all such debts, obligations and daims shaH he held illegal and void." Id.
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and ambiguous enough to encompass the situation presented by
the Alabama's bell. l53 The court's treatment of the succession
question was thus very much in the spirit of its treatment of
another controversial issue that arose during and after the Civil
War-the question of confiscation. The government's confiscation
policy, enacted by Congress and dutifully enforced by the courts,
took advantage of the ambiguous nature of the conflict in order
to gain maximum control over Confederate property with minimum damage to the government's position that it was dealing
with a rebellion. Because these themes recur in the way in
which the Steinmetz court addressed the question of piracy and
Confederate sovereignty vis-à-vis the doctrine of succession, a
brief discussion of the federal government's approach to confiscation is merited.
One of the earliest pieces of legislation after the outbreak of
the Civil War dealt with the confiscation of property. On August
6, 1861, Congress passed "An Act to confiscate Property used for
Insurrectionary Purposes, "154 providing for the confiscation of
any property used or intended to be used in aiding or abetting
the "insurrection. "155 The Act also declared that slave owners
would forfeit their right to own slaves if those slaves were permitted to work in any way connected with the Confederacy's war
effort. l56 A second confiscation act was passed on July 17,
1862,157 and presented a trickier problem of interpretation. On
the one hand, the second confiscation act referred to the war as
a rebellion and its early sections deait with treason. l58 Congress set forth punishment, including the freeing of slaves, for
those convicted of aiding the rebellion. 159 The confiscation por153. Id.; see also discussion infra notes 180-203 and accompanying text.
154. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589.
158. Id.
159. The treatment of slaves was replete with its own contradictions. The 1861
Act treated slaves as property for the purposes of the forfeiture of slave owners'
rights if the slaves worked in aid of the rebellion, but the forfeiture did not make
the slaves the property of the United States, as other property became upon confiscation. See Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319. Congress's silence on this
point implied that the slaves became free upon the forfeiture of the slave owners'
rights. Thus, through its confiscation legislation, Congress undermined slavery
without declaring itself on the legality of the institution in general. See SHAPIRO,
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tion of that act considerably broadened the definition of those
persons whose property would be confiscated to include persons
holding an official title in the government or army of the Confederacy and civilians who offered any support whatsoever to the
Confederacy.l60 According to the second act, the Union could
confiscate all manner of traitors' property, regardless of whether
that particular property was used directly to aid the rebellion, or
whether it was located within or outside of the seceded
stateS. 1Bl This would seem to imply that Congress was exercising its municipal powers to punish those convicted of the crime
of treason. As such, defendants in such cases apparently would
be entitled to a trial and all of the due process protections of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. l62
On the other hand, however, the second confiscation act
prescribed that judicial proceedings under the law. would be in
rem. l63 As, in admiralty and revenue cases, proceedings would
be against the property at issue rather than its owner. Thus, the
owner was not in fact entitled to all of the constitutional
protections accorded criminal defendants. Still, sections five
through seven of the act also seemed to prescribe punishment
for certàin acts because they made confiscation contingent not
solely on the use of certain property but on the status or actions
(e.g., holding a particular office or aiding the rebellion) of the
owner. l64 Thus, the second confiscation act contained an inherent ambiguity as to the legal status and legal rights of those

supra note 16, at 12·13.
160. 12 Stat. 589, 590 (1862).
161. Id.
162. The Fifth Amendment states: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth
Amendment states: "In ail criminal prosecutions, the accused shall eI\Ïoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed; wbich district shall have been previously ascer·
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against bim; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in bis favor, and to have assistance of counsel for bis defense." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
163. 12 Stat. 589, 591 (1862).
164. 12 Stat. 589, 590 (1862). In fact, Lincoln was skeptical of the 1862 law.
RANDALL, supra note la, at 280. Prior to its passage he objected to, among other
things, in rem proceedings against property in a measure that cIearly was intended
to punish the rebels. RANDALL, supra note 10, at 280.
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supporting the Confederacy and their property.
Although the courts adjudicated confiscation cases during
the war, the constitutionality of the confiscation legislation was
not determined until after the war. In 1870, in Miller v. United
States,t65 the Supreme Court took the opportunity to decide
this legal issue in the context of the dual theory of the war that
the government, through ail three branches, had been developing ever since the Prize Cases.
In determining whether the United States could condemn
the property of rebels, the Court began with the assumption that
the right to condemn enemy property during war was an accepted practice in international law. l65 Moreover, the Constitution
gave Congress the power to declare war and "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water."167 In international wars
the definition of an enemy is simply one residing in enemy territory, and the property of sucb- persons is subject to confiscation. l68 Confiscation is justified in those circumstances as
an instrument of coercion, which, by depriving an enemy of property within reach of his power, whether within his territory or
without it, impairs his ability to resist the confiscating government, while at the same time it furnishes to that government
means for carrying on the war. Hence any property which the
enemy can use, either by actual appropriation or by the exercise
of control over its owner, or which the adherents of the enemy
have the power of devoting to the enemy's use, is a proper subject
of confiscation. 169

Thus, in order to be subject to confiscation, the owner need
have done nothing more than simply reside in enemy territory;
he need not have committed any crime or used his property in
any certain way. In a civil war, the Court noted, a person's geographical location is not necessarily a fair indicator of whether
he is an enemy or whether his property is subject to use by the
enemy.170 In order to determine what property is subject to
confiscation, Congress had to define enemy, and in so defining
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

78 li.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
Miller, 78 li.S. (11 Wall.) at 306-07.
li.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
Müler, 78 li.S. (11 Wall.) at 310.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 311-12.
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that term, it designated certain acts as prerequisites, one of
which was aiding or abetting the rebellion. l71 Thus, the Miller
Court concluded, confiscation was not a punishnient for those
acts; rather, those acts were the way that Congress defined an
enemy.172 Once the definition was set, the enemy's property
could be confiscated just as it could be in an international
war. 173 By this logic, the Court tllmed an affirmative intentional act of an individual into a mere description of property.
ln Miller, the Supreme Court had to go one step beyond its
analysis in the Prize Cases. In the latter case, the Court condoned Congress and the President's dual definition of the
war. 174 It held that when the blockade of Southern ports was
initiated, there was in fact a war going on, thereby entitling the
President and Congress to exercise war powers in establishing a
blockade even 'though the United States could also treat the
Confederates as traitors and punish them under the municipal
law. 175 ln addressing the question of the validity of in rem proceedings under the confiscation acts in Miller, the Court approved the dual status of those aiding the Confederate cause
both as enemies and as traitors:
[W]hen it [a rebellion] has become a recognized war those who
are engaged in it are to be regarded as enemies. And they are not
the Iess such because they are aIso rebels. They are equally weIl
designated as rebels or enemies. Regarded as descriptio personarum, the words "rebels" and "enemies," in such a state of
things, are synonymous. 176

Thus, one who aided the rebellion could be tried as a traitor
and in that proceeding given due process protection as required
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but at the same time his
property could be confiscated as if he were an enemy. In the
171. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589, 590.
172. Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 312·13.
173. See id. at 306-07. Notably, despite the insistence that the Confederates were
being treated as enemies in an international war, the federaI govemment taxed the
Confederate states in order ta raÎse war revenue and when they were not paid, it
levied huge penalties, in addition ta forfeiting the property in question. See
RAN1>ALL, supra note 10, at 317.
174. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666-71 (1862).
175. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 666-67. See supra discussion at notes 17- .
22.
176. Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 309.
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latter proceeding, because ofhis status as an enemy, no due process protection was required. Miller set forth a legal justification, based on the Prize Cases, for imposing a dual status, not
only in regard to the nature of the war, but also as to the nature
of the enemies.
Although the Steinmetz court did not analyze Miller in its
opinion, the Steinmetz opinion is very much in the spirit of the
earlier case. The sweeping confiscation law passed by Congress
in 1862 gave the federal government broad powers to take property belonging to "rebels."177 Because the Confederacy at the
time was a fledgling govemment that desperately needed the
financial support of its private citizens in order to survive, the
ability of the United States government to seize private property
in a fairly routine way presented a serious threat to the Confederate cause. 17S The Supreme Court's retroactive interpretation
of the second confiscation act provided a legal justification for
the Union's wartime position that the federal government could
utilize this powerful tool of war without jeopardizing its daim to
continuous sovereignty over its enemy.
Whereas confiscation deals with the right of the United
States to take enemy property during the war, the question of
succession deals with the govemment's right after the war to the
property that once belonged to an enemy who, for all intents and
purposes, had disappeared and ceased to exist. In determining
the contours of succession, courts developed a theory that, like
their approach to confiscation, acknowledged the sovereignty of
the Confederacy only insofar as it served the United States and
preserved its own flexibility in the exercise of that sovereignty.
Succession, as the 8teinmetz court's discussion reveals, is
not a well defined doctrine. Generally speaking, the question of
succession arises in three situations: when astate ceases to
exist; when astate is succeeded by another state; or when the
identity of the state continues in consequence of changes in its

177. See Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589, 590 and supra text
accompanying notes 158-65.
178. See Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 306. The Miller Court stated that "[t)he
whole doctrine of confiscation is built upon the foundation that it is an instrument
of coereion, which, by depriving an enemy of property within reach of his power,
whether within his territory or without it, impairs his ability to resist the confiscating government."
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legal order as of government, territory, or population. 179
Scholars do not agree, however, about the extent to which
the successor state inherits benefits and liabilities from the
extinction of astate which had the legal status of an international person. Some scholars have argued that the successor
state takes on the liabilities as weIl as the benefits of the extinct
state: "Change of goverilment does not affect the personality of
the State, and hence a successor government is required by
international law to perform the obligations undertaken on behalf of the State by its predecessor."I80 By contrast, others
have stated that although "certain rights and duties actuaIly
and reaIly devolve upon an International Person from its predecessor . . . no general rule can be laid down concerning aIl the
cases in which a succession takes place. These cases must be
discussed singly."ISI
In the Steinmetz case, the United States contended that it
was entitled to the property that the Confederate government
had amassed. 1S2 In order to determine the proper ownership of
the beIl, the Steinmetz court had to determine what theory of
succession the United States had adopted, knowingly or unknowingly, after the Civil War.
A number of cases arose after the Civil Warin which ownership by the United States of property previously owned by the
rebel government was at issue. l83 In these cases, the courts'
understanding of the succession doctrine was that when succession occurred, not only the property but also the debts and obligations attached to that property passed to the successor
state. l84 This interpretation of the doctrine is evident in United
States v. Huckabee. l85 Huckabee had sold his iron works to the
Confederacy for $600,000 in Confederate money. The United
States captured the property, forfeited it under the 1861 con179. 2 MARJORIE M. WIUTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 754 (1963).
180. 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 456 (1965).
181. 1 LAssA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 158 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
182. United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 1992), ceri. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993).
183. Bee, e.g., United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414 (1872); Leathers
v. Salver Wrecking Co., 15 F. Cas. 166 (C.C.S.D. Miss. 1875) (No. 8, 164).
184. United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414 (1872); Leathers v. Salver
Wrecking Co., 15 F. Cas. 166 (C.C.S.D. Miss. 1875) (No. 8, 164).
185. 83 U.S. (11 Wall.) 414 (1872).
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fiscation act, and subsequently sold it ta Lyons. The Court, although finding it had no jurisdiction ta hear the case, essentially
affirmed the ownership of the iron works in Lyons. l86 In explaining that the United States derived its title from the capture
of the iron works and that the title was finalized with the subsequent defeat of the Confederacy, the Court stated:
[I]f the nation is entirely subdued, or in case it be destroyed and
ceases to exist ... [the rights of the conqueror] are no longer
limited to mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual
possession, but they extend to aIl the property and rights of the
conquered state, including even debts as weIl as personal and real
property.187

This understanding of succession was adopted by the court
in Leathers v. Salvor Wrecking Co./86 a federal case from Mississippi decided in 1875. Leathers held that the United States
had succeeded after the war to the ownership of a private steamer pressed into service by the Confederate government because
the Confederate government had fully paid the owner for the
boat. 189 The language of that case, unlike the 8teinmetz case,
seemed ta imply that if the boat had not been fully paid for by
the Confederacy, the United States might not have succeeded ta
it:
If the steamer Natchez was impressed into the service of the
Confederate States government, and was burnt and sunk whilst
in that service, and if full compensation for the vesse1's loss was
paid to the libelant by that government, the property of the wreck
thereafter belonged to it; and at the close of the war, became the
property of the government of the United States, which thereupon
acquired a right to dispose of the wreck as it saw fit. l90

Research has not uncovered any cases from the United States in
which the court was faced with a claim by the United States ta
property owned by the Confederacy but without clear title.
There are, however, as the 8teinmetz court pointed out,
sorne English cases after the Civil War in which the United
186. Huckabee, 83 U.S. at 414.
187. Id. at 434.
188. 15 F. Cas. 116 (C.C.S.D. Mis8. 1875) (No. 8, 164).
189. Leathers, 15 F. Cas. at 116.
190. Id.
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States claimed property which had been owned by the Confederate government. 191 The English courts acknowledged that the
United States had the right of succession to the public property
of the Confederate government, subject however to the debts and
obligations attached to that property.l92 In United States v.
McCrae,193 for example, the English Court of Chancery found
in favor ofMcCrae, a Confederate agent who had advanced money on behalf of the Confederacy for the purchase of certain
goodS. I94 Since the United States refused to pay McCrae the
money owed to him by the Confederacy, the United States was
not permitted, the court ruled, to succeed to the goods in question. The court said:
But this right is the right of succession, is the right of representation, is a right not paramount, but derived, l will not say under,
but through, the suppressed and displaced authority, and can
only be enforced in the sarne way, and to the sarne extent, and
subject to the sarne correlative obligations and rights as if that
authority had not been suppressed and displaced and was itself
seeking to enforce it. 195

Steinmetz argued that these cases, as weIl as the dictum in the
American cases about succession including debts, failed to consider the language of the Fourteenth Amendment which forbade
the United States from taking on any of the debts of the Confederacy.l96 Section Four of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
states that the United States would not "assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States."197 There is scarce legislative history to this
part of that famous amendment. It is clear, however, that although other sections of the Amendment were fiercely debated,
191. United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 221 (3d Ciro 1992), ceri. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993) (citing United States v. McCrae, 8 L.R.-Eq. 69 (1869); United
States v. Prioleau, 35 L.R.-Ch. 7 (1865».
192. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 221.
193. 8 L.R.-Eq. 69 (1869).
194. McCrae, 8 L.R.-Eq. at 69.
195. Id. at 75; see also United States v. Prioleau, 35 L.R.-Ch. 7, 11 (1865) (stating that the cotton owned by the Confederacy with a lien held by members of an
English firm was property of the United States, subject to all of the conditions and
liabilities to which the property is subject).
196. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 221.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
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there was a general consensus among the Republican framers of
the Amendment, and President Johnson alike, that the Confederate debt should be repudiated and the national debt validated. l98
The Fourteenth Amendment's repudiation of the Confederate debt was interpreted by the courts to negate contracts involving Confederate bonds,l99 but there appears to be no evidence that repudiation was ever tied to the issue of the North's
succeeding to the property of the Confederacy. Although the
Amendment had been passed by the time all of the cases relied
upon by the Steinmetz court were decided, none of them even
mentioned the debt clause.
Rather than confront the issue of whether section four of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevented the United States from invoking the succession doctrine, the 8teinmetz court dealt only
with the question of succession as it arose in this case.2OO Since
there was no allegation that the Confederacy had not fully paid
for the Alabama and its bell,201 the United States could succeed to it even under a definition of succession that includes
debts. 8teinmetz went beyond Leathers by recognizing the prob-

198. See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE F'RAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 26-27
(1956). Republicans feared that if blacks were not given the vote, Southerners and
sympathetic Northern Democrats would form a majority in Congress and, along with
demanding compensation for their emancipated slaves, repudiate the national debt.
See BENAJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMI'ITEE OF FIFTEEN
ON RECONSTRUCTION 283-85 (1914). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment includes a
statement of the validity of the national debt. See id.
199. See, e.g., Branch v. Haas, 16 F. 53 (C.C.M.D. Aja. 1883).
200. See Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 221-22.
201. Id. at 221. Steinmetz argued that there were in fact liabilities attached ta
the Alabama when it sank in 1864. Id. These liabilities were the claims by neutral
shipping for unlawful acts committed by the Alabama. Id. at 215. What Steinmetz
overlooked was the fact that the United States actually considered those claims ta
he against Great Britain, which had facilitated the building and arming of the
Alabama and similar vessels. Id. This claim was the basis for the Treaty with Great
Britain, 17 Stat. 863 (1871), which established an international arbitration panel and
100 ta the payment by Great Britain of $15.5 million ta the United States for the
depredation of the Alabama and her sister ships. Id. Thua, it may he that the
succession theory, as stated by the Huckabee and Leathers courts, as weIl as the
English courts, is the correct one, but that in the case of the Alabama, the liabilities lay elsewhere in a third party, that is, Great Britain. This theory still leaves
open the question of how the Fourteenth Amendment would he interpreted were a
court ever faced with a succession claim by the United States where outstanding
liabilities attached ta the property in question.
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lem posed by the Fourteenth Amendment, but, like Leathers, it
1eR that question open:
Even though there may be sorne question as to the' exact
contours of the succession doctrine as applied by the United
States after the Civil War, in the case of the ALABAMA there
were no outstanding liabilities for which the United States might
have been responsible had it asserted its title to the ALABAMA
right after the war. Steinmetz does not allege that the ALABAMA
was not fully paid for by the Confederacy.
It follows that whether or not historians would regard the
international law of succession as applicable here, the succession,
doctrine, as explicated and applied by the United States Supreme
Court with respect to the Civil War, entitled the United States to
all property acquired by the Confederacy.202

VI. CONCLUSION

The judiciaI interpretatiori of the blockade and the confiscation acts reinforced the strong aIliance among the three branches of government that was necessary ta enable the federaI government ta prosecute the war ta its fullest advantage. The federaI courts assumed the role of placing the imprimatur of legality
on the various methods used by the federaI government ta prosecute the war, no matter how attenuated the legaI reasoning had
ta be. Similarly, as the decision in 8teinmetz demonstrates, just
as the federaI government refused ta limit itself ta one theory
about the nature of the conflict during the war, it aIso did not
adopt and maintain a single theory for its resolution. A peace

202. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at 221-22 (footnote omitted). The Steinmetz court relied
to sorne extent on Randall who makes the argument that it is inappropriate to consider the United States's actions after the war as acta of a suceessor per se:
[T]o argue that the United States should have taken over the Confederate
debt would he to assume that the Confederate States had existed hefore the
war as an established international person, and had then been conquered and
absorbed by the United States. Even then, prevailing international practice
would have suggested that Confederate debta incurred for the war itself
should not he assumed. . • • The defeat of such a rival government did not
amount to the overthrow or absorption of an existing "state" in the international sense. As to the principIe of state-continuity, it was preserved, in the
fact that the United States was not suppIanted in ita control over the South.
RANDALL, supra note 10, at 238 n.51.
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treaty, which might have defined the nature of the conflict and
set out terms for reconstruction, was never drawn up or
signed. 203 Rather, Congress and the President addressed discrete issues in postwar legislation and in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution (the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which laid out the broad
concepts of equal protection and due process, is the exception).
The courts, in adjudicating disputes that implicated the broader
legal contours of the war, were left with the task of creating
sorne legal order out of the federal govemment's various policies.
This order, in tum, reinforced and supported the flexibility that
the govemment needed in order to gain full advantage over the
South both during and after the war. Like their predecessors in
the Prize Cases and Miller, Steinmetz and the amici204 who
supported his case emphasized the United States's official refusal to recognize the Confederacy and attempted to get the court,
in essence, to force the federal govemment to limit itself to one
legal theory about the nature of the Civil War. What they failed
to appreciate was the great latitude that the courts gave to the
United States in defining the nature of the war and its resolution. This flexibility, as the Steinmetz case demonstrates, continues to be the unifying theme in the continuing questions
about the legal nature of the Civil War.

203. As the Court in Huckabee stated, "as the confederation having been utterly
destroyed no treaty of peace was or could he made, as a treaty requires at least two
contracting parties." United States v. Huckahee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 414, 434 (1872).
204. The amici curiae aligned with Steinmetz were the American Sports Divers
Association, Federation of Metal Detector & Archeological Clubs, Alliance for Maritime Heritage Conservation, International Scuba Association, Eastern Dive Boat
Association, and North-South Trader Civil War Magazine. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d at
217. Writing in support of the United States's position were the National Trust for
Historical Preservation in the United States, Society of Professional Archeologists,
Society for Historical Archaeology, Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology,
Society for American Archaeology, and Council of American Maritime Museums. Id.

